'Jeff' Jefferies of Rear Window (1954) , who's a decent, caring man and a peeping tom with a camera? And imagine how these 'naturally good' moviegoers must feel when they find themselves swept away by a Hitchcock film, impulsively rooting for Bruno Anthony's groping hand to seize the fateful cigarette lighter in Strangers on a Train (1951) or for Marion Crane's incriminating car to reach the bottom of the swamp in Psycho. In scenes like these, Hitchcock doesn't just allege a naturally-not-good side of human nature, he pretty well proves the case, using audience responses as Exhibit A in his presentation. And despite the protestations of ideological pundits, his works remain a living force in world cinema. My university students respond with more enthusiasm to films like Blackmail (1929) and Psycho and Rear Window and North by Northwest (1959) than to the great majority of 'old movies' by other directors. Hitchcock thrillers maintain good sales on DVD and still exert a healthy influence on auteurs around the world. Allegiance to the Master of Suspense is clearly alive and well among spectators, filmmakers, and an ever-growing array of scholars-those of us who, in Grenier's words, `have captured teaching posts at universities, from which position they attempt to stem the anarchist tide' (ibid., 32). One of those scholars is John Orr, whose outstanding Hitchcock and Twentieth-Century Cinema opens new doors in Hitchcock criticism while mounting a powerful argument for the director's ongoing centrality in cinematic discourse.
In his opening chapter, Orr lays out his film-historical and film-critical agendas, which naturally overlap throughout the book; in the second chapter he sketches his filmphilosophical agenda, which informs and enriches his analyses, sometimes explicitly and sometimes not. As its title hints, Hitchcock and Twentieth-Century Cinema presents the protean Master of Suspense as a "matrix-figure" (8) of modern film, playing a hugely influential role in cinema's evolution from the silent era to the present day. Although he doesn't say exactly what a matrix-figure is, Orr takes the term from an admirable source: the space and spectacle of his vision' places the 'short, portly' director-a mirror image of Stewart's lean, tall figure-at the center of 'not only…his own cinema but of cinema as such', channeling the best legacies of the past into new achievements that helped to shape film's present and future. 'So much shock', Orr writes in eloquent tribute, 'so much suspense, so much montage, so much mystery, so much watching, so much doubling, so much disaster, so much redemption: it all goes back to him'. The link between Hitch and his fellow filmmakers thus emerges as 'a form of fate that ties in through echo and repetition down the years' (ibid.), binding the Master of Suspense to the destiny of cinema itself.
Orr's ability to wax poetic in passages like this doesn't mean he skimps on historical details or sensitive interpretations of individual films. He is careful to enumerate the preexisting fundamentals of cinema that Hitch gratefully harvested at numerous stages of his career, especially during the aesthetically formative 1920s period when he was a cinephile in English film clubs and theatres, a tyro in the British film industry, and a hugely impressed young visitor to Germany's mighty UFA studio. It was in those years that he 'absorb [Hitchcock] into the world of their own vision', building 'parallel worlds' (7) from starting points boldly independent of his. Along with the matrix-figure, the key to Hitchcock most effectively used by Orr is the notion of exchange, which Rohmer and Chabrol identified in the 1950s and divided into four basic varieties: moral exchange, or the transfer of guilt; psychological exchange, via suspicion; dramatic exchange, as in blackmail; and concrete exchange, manifested in toand-fro movements (Rohmer and Chabrol 1957, ix) . Orr complicates this scheme in two ways: first, by observing that in Hitchcock any exchange of a given kind generally includes some aspects of the other three kinds; second, by explaining how Hitchcock uses his polyvalent transfers as 'a register of shifting power-relations' whereby his protagonists make moves for and against one another in ceaselessly evolving, frequently fatal games.
These insights facilitate many productive readings throughout the book: the exchange in Shadow of a Doubt that transfers young Charlie from one gaze to another and from trust into suspicion; the origin of Notorious (1946) in a transfer of guilt from an executed Nazi father to his troubled antifascist daughter; and the transactions through interrogation in
The Paradine Case (1947) , to name only three. In later parts of the book, where Orr traces Hitchcockian thematics in diverse films by other directors, we find David Lynch forging 'a dynamics of exchange based on guilt, sexuality and memory' (153) and film noir fleshing out 'the fatal triangle of fall guy, femme fatale and victim by adding on financial exchange to its conspiracy of passion' (155, Orr's emphasis). We also discover an 'exchange signifying the sacrifice that perverse miracle entails' in Chabrol's ferocious La Rupture (The Breakup, 1970) , one of several films that Orr discusses in terms of 'perverse miracle' plot twists that deftly transform time-tested narrative formulas. Conversely, we find an absence of exchange objects in Rohmer's moral tale My Night at Maud's (Ma nuit chez Maud, 1969), wherein life itself is 'the immediate source of [a] perverse miracle' that allows the naïve hero to proceed into the future without the 'forgetting and suppression of a painful past' (151) sought after by his traumatised counterpart in the memory-haunted Vertigo.
In an effort to move beyond the Roman Catholic perspective embraced by Rohmer and Chabrol in their Hitchcock book-appropriately, since Hitchcock was himself a Catholic, if a more-or-less lapsed one--Orr simultaneously affirms and vaults over their metaphysic by drawing on René Girard's idea that the Passion of the Christ represented a 'symbolic exchange' that replaced blood sacrifice with self sacrifice, producing a sense of irredeemable guilt among believers dismayed by humanity's collective culpability for Jesus's crucifixion (Girard 1979, 39-67) . Hitchcock intuitively works out this scenario in secular terms, locating the source of guilt not in the divine goodness represented by Jesus's bitter sacrifice, but rather in 'the evil of mankind that we are also powerless to prevent' (40). In this way Hitchcock renders the transfer of guilt empirical and also It is a truism that no book is perfect, and after praising so much in Orr's book, I have some criticisms to add. One is that while Hitchcock and Twentieth-Century Cinema is unquestionably an auteurist study, allowing Hitchcock the credit (and occasionally the blame) for just about everything in just about every film, Orr doesn't theorize his position on auteurism or even set forth a rationale for the particular ways in which he exercises it; a brief account of this would have been welcome. Another is that Orr's emphasis of Hume as a gateway to Hitchcock's thought is more exclusive than it has to be, needlessly curbing the book's philosophical scope. To suggest just one avenue that occurred to me while reading his main chapter on Hitchcock and Hume, the valuable insight that Hitchcock's characters 'are what they are because they are what they become in the duration of his plots' (41) might be profitably pursued in the terms of numerous modern philosophers, such as William James, who observed that the 'fundamental fact about our experience is that it is a process of change…. [O] wing to the fact that all experience is a process, no point of view can ever be the last one' (James 1911, 89-90, emphasis in original) . Similarly, the edgy philosophical flash of Slavoj Žižek came to mind in relation to Orr's statement that fiction 'is an elegant construction….But within its framework chaos ensues ' (41 These are minor glitches in what is mostly a bold, insightful, and wonderfully creative book. Orr makes it clear on page after page that Hitchcock was a moral-ethical thinker-indeed, a moral-ethical philosopher-whose perceptions and insights were no less dazzling because they came from the mind of a popular moviemaker instead of an aesthetician or academic. 'Hume was a philosopher by profession,' Orr writes, 'Hitchcock by default' (26) . Although sheer cinematic talent was the source of his almost preternatural skill at making us nail-biting witnesses of fates that are 'not ours but well could be' (ibid.), resources in a far deeper stratum of his mind gave birth to the engrossing riches of his endlessly intricate, profoundly thoughtful art. He was a philosopher of the twentieth century, and one suspects he was a thinker for the ages as well. Orr makes the case with an elegance and eloquence that live consistently up to their subject. 11.3 
